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State Régulation of Trade Disputes 
in Essential Services in Nigeria 
Tayo Fashoyin 
This paper examines the management of trade disputes in 
essential services in Nigeria and identifies two settlement ap-
proaches which are seen to hâve the opposite effects to those in-
tended. 
Until about a décade ago little attention, if any, was paid to the pro-
cédure for the settlement of trade disputes in Nigeria, although the Trade 
Disputes (Arbitration and Inquiry) Ordinance was enacted as far back as 
19411. This law embodied the British principle of voluntarism upon which 
the Nigérian System of industrial relations was based. Characteristically, 
voluntarism recognises the freedom of labour and management to manage 
their day-to-day affairs, though within the limits of the légal framework. 
Thus, while the law made provision for conciliation, arbitration and inquiry 
(the latter is commonly referred to as fact-finding in the West) for the settle-
ment of trade disputes, it recognised the right of the parties to décide which 
of thèse methods they would use while the Minister of Labour (until recent-
ly known as Commissioner) must obtain the consent of the parties in 
prescribing either of the above methods for settlement of dispute. Further-
more, the award or décision of any of the methods was not binding on 
either party to a dispute. 
While it could be argued that the apparent permissiveness of the law 
could inhibit government intervention in any serious industrial crisis were 
the law enforced to its letters, the argument would be superficial, for 
governments had never shown remorse or anxiety in exercising their 
suprême power by going outside the realms of the law. Indeed, governments 
had customarily abandoned the trade disputes ordinance when dealing with 
trade disputes that might, rightly or wrongly, be regarded as subversive or 
threatening to public peace. For example, the war-time General Defence 
Régulations of 1941 and later the Criminal Code of 1958 were invoked when 
dealing with trade disputes in essential services. This had frequently led to 
• FASHOYIN, T., Professor, University of Lagos and University of Sussex. 
•• An earlier version of this paper was présentée! at the Fifth World Congress of the In-
ternational Industrial Relations Association in Paris in September 1979. 
î Renamed the Trade Disputes (Arbitration and Inquiry) Act, 1958, Cap. 201. 
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the détention of outspoken trade unionists such as Michael Imoudu during 
the trade unions* formative years2. This approach to the seulement of 
disputes had been more or less the norm throughout the country's labour 
history. This had, almost without exception, been accompanied by dis-
missal, prosecution and conviction3. 
In principle, restrictive législation are enforced where the conduct of 
labour relations is perceived to be threatening to public peace or where it 
amounts to depriving the public essential services which might resuit from 
industrial action4. 
In any event, because government found greater usefulness in the more 
restrictive législation there was, until 1976, no strong need to enact spécifie 
laws on trade disputes in essential services. Indeed, the term "essential ser-
vices" had rarely been used, except the référence in the Criminal Code 
which, as already mentioned, had been used to prevent any strike that might 
obstruct the provision of essential services5. Undoubtedly, the character of 
Nigérian unions is regarded as one major explanation for the passiveness of 
government because the trade union movement was, until recently, 
hopelessly proliferated into ineffective mushroom unions of 1 170 most of 
which were even incapable of utilising the existing législation effectively. 
This paper examines the management of trade disputes in essential ser-
vices in Nigeria. It identifies two settlement approaches which are seen to 
hâve the opposite effects to those intended. The paper concludes that a pro-
gressive approach to the settlement of trade disputes should not only reflect 
the goals of public policy but must produce mutually satisfactory results. 
THE ORIGIN OF THE LAW 
To begin with, it is désirable to understand the main reasons why 
government enacted a spécial législation on disputes in essential services. 
Undoubtedly, the Nigérian civil war of 1967-70 served as the immédiate 
cause for introducing what may now be regarded as revolutionary labour 
législation in Nigeria. As expected, the primary attention of government 
2 See E.E. UVIEGHARA, Trade Union Law in Nigeria, Bénin City, Ethiope Publish-
ing Corporation, 1976, pp. 25-26. 
3 Ibid., pp. 26-29 and Robin COHEN, Labour and Politics in Nigeria, London, 
Heinemann Educational Books Ltd., 1974, Chapter 7. 
4 See A.A. ADEOGUN, "Industrial Relations and the Law" in T.O. Elias (éd.), Law 
and Social Change in Nigeria, Lagos, University of Lagos-Evans Brothers Ltd., 1972, p. 123. 
5 Ibid., loc. cit.. As will be argued in this paper the distinction between disputes in 
essential services and other types of disputes is only a formality for the définition of the former 
is so broad as to include ail conceivable types of dispute. 
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during the period was focussed on how to end the war while preserving the 
unity of the country. Class action, as demonstrated by some unions, was 
not only anti-government but equally unpatriotic, as far as public opinion 
was concerned. Therefore, the need to bring the unions "under strict con-
trol" serves as the main goal of the Trade Disputes Emergency Decrees of 
1968 and 1969 which significantly circumscribed the freedom of unions (and 
to a lesser extent, employers) in the labour-management relationship6. 
There was also the salient économie factor dietated by a eombination of 
rapid économie activity resulting primarily from the unprecedented increase 
in oil wealth, and a programme of reconstruction immediately after the 
war. 
Partly in efforts to ensure uninterupted implementation of thèse 
developments and partly in response to mounting trade union pressure for 
improvement in wages and conditions of service which had deteriorated 
during the war, government established the Adebo Wages and Salaries 
Review Commission whose responsibility, among others, was to review 
wages and salaries in the public sector and make appropriate awards7. Like 
its predecessors, the Adebo Commission awards produced more controver-
sies than the demands for its establishment, and quite unexpectedly, led to 
strikes not only in the public sector but in the private sector as well. Yet, 
three years later another body — the Udoji Public Service Review Com-
mission, primarily charged to harmonise wages and salaries in the public 
sector with those in the private sector was established. Its recommendations 
or awards were widely disputed, again in both sector s. This rather chaotic 
System of wage détermination has itself been disruptive to the maintenance 
of industrial peace in Nigeria8. 
Yet the conséquence of widespread industrial unrest in the country, but 
particularly in major économie sectors such as petroleum, banking and 
manufacturing could be disastrous on the economy. In the oil industry, for 
example, popular thinking has been, as recently expressed in a national 
newspaper, that "everything that concerns oil concerns our vital national 
interest"9. In the banking industry, also, some union leaders has insisted on 
maintaining the existing differentials between workers in the industry and 
those in other sectors, an apparent objection not only to government har-
6 FASHOYIN, Tayo, "The Impact of the Trade Disputes Decrees of 1968 and 1969 on 
Strike Activity", Quarterly Journal of Administration, Vol. XIII, No. 1, October 1978, pp. 
53-71. 
7 See the Second and Final Report of the Public Service Review Commission 1970-1971, 
Lagos, Fédéral Ministry of Information, 1971. 
8 For détails of the disputes surrounding both commissions' awards see Tayo 
FASHOYIN, Industrial Relations in Nigeria. Development and Practice, London, Longman 
Group Ltd., 1980, Chapters 6 and 8. 
• 9 Daily Times, 19 February 1979, p. 3. 
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monisation policy but also to the growing need for equity and income dis-
tribution in the country. 
It was generally believed, also, that many of the poorly organised and 
badly led unions could not fully appreciate the importance of certain 
économie sectors to the prosperity of the country. Indeed, as the évidence 
has often shown, thèse unions had embarked on industrial actions without 
bothering to use the procédures enunciated in the law. Furtherniore, the 
government seemed concerned about the activities of some trade unionists 
who, though well informed, were unwilling to educate their followers on 
the need for constructiveness in presenting their demands and also to 
recognise the essentiality of the services they provide to the public. In fact, 
popular impression in officiai circles was that some of thèse union leaders 
were deliberately inciting their followers to cause crisis in the work-place. 
The foregoing views crystallised to produce two major developments. 
The first led to the unprecedented announcement of a revolutionary and 
elaborate National Labour Policy in December 1975. This policy unequiv-
ocally stresses the commitment of government to monitor, if not control the 
activities of the trade unions, both internally and externally. It also empha-
sises the need for unions to form a kind of partnership with government in 
the pursuit of national development10. 
The second, to which this paper is addressed, is the view that rather 
than contain the excesses of some unions and their leaders, it serves the 
greater interest of the country to invalidate the existence of any unions and 
their leaders who contravenes the provisions of the essential services 
decrees. 
In any event, while the above arguments could hâve paved the way for 
the enactment of a law on the essential services as far back as the early 
seventies, it was not until 1976 that a delineation of the essential services 
was made under the Trade Disputes Decree (no. 7) promulgated in that 
year11. Under the decree, essential services are defined to include12: 
(a) The public service of the Fédération or of a State; 
(b) Civilians employed in the Armed Forces of the Fédération; 
(c) Employées of any firm whose services are consumed by the Armed 
Forces; 
io For an elaborate treatment of the new labour policy see my Industrial Relations in 
Nigeria. Development and Practice, op. cit., Chapter 7 and Appendix B. 
11 Hitherto settlement of disputes in ail services in the country had been covered under 
the existing Trade Disputes Emergency Decrees of 1968 and 1969. 
12 See Schedule I of the Trade Disputes Decree No. 7, 1976. Note that the Trade 
Disputes (Essential Services) Decree No. 23, 1976 was promulgated only 3 months later. The 
définition of essential services in both decrees is the same. 
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(d) Any services provided or maintained by any level of government or 
private enterprise which is connected with electricity, power, water or 
fuel of any kind, broadcasting and ail forms of communication, in-
cluding cable and wireless, dock labour including ports, aérodromes, 
ail other means of transportation, hospitals of any kind, public health, 
sanitation of kinds, fire; 
(e) Service in any capacity in the Central Bank of Nigeria, Nigérian Securi-
ty, Printing and Minting Company and any banking business in the 
Fédération13. 
As can be seen, the list comprises a whole gamut of services that could 
legitimately corne under the law. Indeed, it seems correct to suggest that any 
service, irrespective of the sector or industry can be deemed essential depen-
ding on how the service came to be rendered. For example, if an essential 
service, say the National Electric Power Authority (NEPA), contracts a 
business to another firm whose primary function is not power génération, 
say, construction, the latter firm will corne under the provisions of the law. 
Also, if a local government council (an essential service) hires the services of 
a private cleaning company to sweep the streets and workers in this Com-
pany strike, they will be enjoined by the law. The law therefore provides, if 
rather legalistic, conditions for any service in Nigeria to be regarded as 
essential, depending on the particular circumstance. 
PROCEDURE FOR SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES 
Basically the procédure for settling trade disputes in Nigeria is the same 
in ail sectors or services, though there are différences of approach when 
considering an essential service. Thus under the Trade Disputes Decree 
1976, either party to a dispute may inform the Commissioner for Labour133 
in writing of the existence of a trade dispute, the issues involved and the in-
ternai machinery that had been used to bring about seulement14. The Com-
missioner is empowered to refer the dispute to conciliation, inquiry, arbi-
tration or industrial court, usually in that order, although he need not 
follow this séquence. In any event, if a conciliator is appointed, the con-
ciliator is required to report back to the Commissioner within 14 days if he 
13 See Trade Disputes (Essential Services) Decree No. 23, 1976, Section 8. 
i3a Under the new civilian constitution the Commissioner is now called Minister. Hère 
we shall refer to him as the Commissioner for this makes no différence in his rôle with respect 
to interpreting or enforcing the law. 
u Section 4. It is equally possible for the Commissioner for Labour to apprehend a 
dispute if he is satisfied that such a dispute exist. 
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is unable to bring about settlement and within another 14 days the case is 
referred to the Industrial Arbitration Panel. The arbitration award should 
normally be given within 42 days, although this time could, and has often 
been extended. If the award is satisfactory to both parties it becomes law, 
otherwise an appeal is made to the National Industrial Court through the 
Commissioner. The décision of this court is final. Note that throughout 
thèse stages the strike is illégal; although the law does not specifically ban 
strikes, it does make it practically impossible to engage in légal strikes. 
The above describes very briefly the procédure for settling any labour 
dispute. With respect to the essential services there are the following dif-
férences. First, unlike disputes in non-essential services, section 31(1) of the 
Trade Disputes Decree categorically prohibit the use of strike weapon by 
workers employed in the essential services. Second, the Commissioner for 
Labour does not hâve to wait for the report of the conciliator before he 
acts. In fact, when to intervene in a dispute in an essential service wholly dé-
pend on what is at stake; he may enter the picture as soon as it is obvious to 
him that conciliation would be meaningless or inappropriate in which case 
he may refer the dispute to arbitration or directly to the industrial court15. 
But as will be shown, not only is this procédure completely insensitive to the 
nature of disputes in the essential services, it is quite distinct from the inévi-
table machinery under which disputes are settled. It will be shown that the 
ultimate course of settlement has been through means outside the légal 
framework. When this occurs the government, as it must, takeover the 
dispute from the affected management and assumes full control for bring-
ing about settlement of the dispute. 
PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION 
Under the Trade Disputes Decree, 1976, if an individual engages in an 
illégal strike, he is liable to a fine of N100.0015a or imprisonment for six 
months. In the case of an organisation, eg. a firm or a union, it is liable to a 
fine of N1,000.0016. Ironically, penalties of fine hâve scarcely been enforc-
ed, particularly on workers or unions because in real life, imposition of 
penalties of this kind on workers and unions in Nigeria serve no less a design 
to discourage workers who hold only fragile allegiance to trade unionism. 
Furthermore, enforcement of penalties of the same kind on unions will un-
is See Section 5 of the Trade Disputes (Essential Services) Decree No. 23, 1976, and Sec-
tion 12 of the Trade Disputes Decree No. 7, 1976. 
15a NI = $1.77, approximately. 
16 Section 13 (2) of the Trade Disputes Decree No. 7, 1976. 
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doubtedly put them out of business because of their poor financial re-
source17. The alternative i.e. imprisonment is the more likely penalty that 
can be enforced on trade unionists, as earlier noted. 
This latter approach closely resemble penalties for violating the law on 
essential services. Note, therefore, that unlike the above provision no op-
tion of fine is available to strikers, their leaders or organisations in the 
essential services. Thus, section (1) of the Trade Disputes (Essential Ser-
vices) Decree, 1976, provides that "if the Head of the Fédéral Military 
Government is satisfied that any trade union or association any of the 
members of which are employed in any essential service (a) is or has been 
engaged in acts calculated to disrupt the economy or acts calculated to 
obstruct or disrupt the smooth running of any essential service; or (b) has, 
where applicable, wilfully failed to comply with the procédure specified in 
the Trade Disputes Decree 1976 in relation to the reporting and settlement 
of trade disputes, he may by order in the Gazette proscribe the trade union 
or association... and the proscribed organisation shall as from the date of 
the order cease to exista' A union so proscribed is required to submit its cer-
tificate of registration to the Registrar of Trade Unions within 14 days and 
ail properties of the union are forfeited to the Fédéral government. 
The law also abrogate the right of members of the union to form or 
join another union until a minimum period of six months has lapsed. Also, 
officiais of a proscribed union are for ever barred from holding leadership 
positions in any union in an essential service. Furthermore a union leader or 
member found to be involved in acts prejudicial to industrial peace after the 
proscription of this union may be detained indefinitely in a prison or police 
custody18. Needless to say that any person so detained would hâve lost his 
right to institute légal action against any matter that may be brought against 
him by government. 
That the law in its construct was decidedly anti-union is reflected in its 
one-sidedness, for it explicitly gave the impression that the onus for indus-
trial unrest in the essential services rest squarely on workers and unions. It is 
therefore not surprising to note the strong opposition and protests against 
the law amongst union leaders19. Thèse protests, though, were not against 
the principle or desirability of a law on essential services but rather its par-
17 For more on this, see M.O. KAYODE, "An Analysis of the Management of Trade 
Union Finance in Nigeria", Nigérian Journal of Economie and Social Studies, Vol. H, No. 3, 
November 1969, pp. 327-342. 
18 Trade Disputes (Essential Services) Decree No. 23, 1976, Section 4. 
19 See The Nigérian Tribune, 27 May 1976. 
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tiality, particularly for failing to put any costs on employer s. This rather 
embarrassing shortcoming of a major public policy did in fact casi: doubts 
on the sincerity of government in its oft-repeated neutrality in labour and 
management relations. In any event admission of partiality was acknowl-
edged in a 1977 amendment to the law which now impose a fine of NI0,000 
on any employer or employers* association that contravene the provisions 
of the law20. 
It is remarkable to note that even though the law explicitly abrogate the 
right to strike or lock-out, strikes in essential services hâve been a common 
occurrence in the country but the government has enforced the proscription 
provisions rather discriminatingly, as will be shown. This brings to question 
the underlying reasons for enacting the law. For observation not only sug-
gest that the law will be used selectively but also show clearly that quite 
apart from the économie rationale adduced earlier, its objectives include 
non-economic contents but also has strong political undertone. Therefore, 
the underlying philosophy of the law is questionable as much as it raises a 
big question of what exactly constitute an essential service. In whatever 
perspective it is viewed, the law leaves an uncertainty as to what political in-
fluence may be brought into the settlement of disputes in the essential ser-
vices from time to time. 
THE EXPERIENCE OF THE LAW 
To fully appreciate the intent of the law-makers a review of the expé-
rience of the law is in order. The discussion thus far implicitly suggests that 
two distinctive catégories of disputes settlement procédures can be iden-
tified, viz: (1) disputes which are amicably settled; this may otherwise be 
referred to as the containment approach, and (2) disputes on which the pro-
scription order was invoked, which may be referred to as the eliminationist 
approach. Some disputes in the two catégories are briefly examined essen-
tially to highlight some salient features of the two approaches. 
As far as the containment approach is concerned, disputes in essential 
services are supposed to be settled as laid down in the law, eg. appointment 
of a conciliator who is usually an officiai of the Fédéral Ministry of 
Labour208. In practice, however, satisfactory settlement has often been 
achieved after intervention of top government officiais. Furthermore, dis-
putes rarely go through the legalistic process or get to the National Indus-
trial Court, partly because the situation becomes extremely tense requiring 
extraordinary measures and partly because of the need for urgent solution. 
20 See Trade Disputes (Essential Services) (Amendment) Decree No. 69, 1977, Section 
la. 
20a Under the récent reorganisation of the civil service, the new administration has 
renamed the Ministry as the Ministry of Employment, Labour and Productivity. Where nec-
essary we shall use the old name. 
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One of the disputes in this category occurred shortly after the law was 
promulgated in 1976. Workers of the Wastes Disposai Board in Lagos em-
barked on industrial action in protest against the Board*s plan to déclare 
redundancy among the workforce. For weeks the streets of Lagos were lit-
tered with refuse as negotiation and conciliation were unsuccessful in bring-
ing about seulement. The impasse was broken at the intervention of the 
State government which immediately ordered the setting aside of the redun-
dancy plan and subsequently induced the workers to résume their work. 
Similarly, the Lagos State branch of the powerful Nigeria Union of 
Teachers (NUT) embarked on a strike action against the Teaching Services 
Commission over arbitrary down-grading of 2,500 teachers and for failing 
to improve other conditions of service for its members. The strike, which 
started from 1 to 20 June 1978, occurred at a critical period when the 
nation-wide end-of-year examinations for primary and secondary schools 
were about to begin. Efforts to use the légal framework failed, as did ap-
peals from traditional and ci vie leaders, and a promise by the Military 
Governor of the State that he would personally look into the teachers' 
grievances. Eventually, the union's term for a call-off of the strike, i.e. the 
appointment of ajudicial commission of inquiry to look into its grievances, 
was accepted by government before the teachers returned to their class-
rooms21. It is noteworthy that members of the NUT in other parts of the 
country similarly went on strike in December 1978 over the same issue of 
poor conditions of service. Thèse latter disputes were settled in the same 
fashion, i.e. outside the légal framework. 
Finally, towards the end of 1978 members of the Lagos State branch of 
the Nigérian Médical Association embarked on a state-wide strike in protest 
against a law barring doctors in government service from private practice22. 
Needless to say that this strike paralysed médical care delivery in the state 
because both government and private hospitals and clinics participated in 
the action. The sick were, in many cases, taken to the adjoining states of 
Ogun and Oyo by their relatives while in some cases, incidences of avoida-
ble deaths occurred23. When it became obvious to government that doctors 
in other parts of the country were planning to join in the action, the Fédéral 
21 Initially the government had appointée! an inquiry (fact-finding) panel under Section 
30 (4) (d) of the Trade Disputes Decree, 1976 to look at the union's grievances but the latter ob-
jected because under the law government would not be bound to accept the views or recom-
mendations of the panel. 
22 Although the strike was planned to be nation-wide, an Edict subsequently published 
by the Lagos State government (unfortunately meant to be a test case), stipulating a tough, and 
perhaps unrealistic standards for the registration of private clinics and hospitals prompted doc-
tors in Lagos State to embark on the strike. 
23 In a particular case at the Lagos Island Maternity Hospital a pregnant woman died 
because no médical attention was fortheoming. 
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Commissioner for Labour and later the Chief of Staff, Suprême Head-
quarters (équivalent of Vice-Président under the presidential System) inter-
vened and subsequently set aside both laws and reinstated the status quo 
pending a review to arrive at a mutually acceptable standard. 
Similar cases hâve occurred in electricity, banking, ports, airways, etc., 
ail regarded as essential services. It should be emphasised that in thèse and 
ail the disputes described above délicate issues of public interest, health and 
safety were involved. But for the most, the disputes hâve been settled ami-
cably, though outside the légal framework and generally through interven-
tion of top government hierarchy. 
Under the eliminationist approach two disputes may be cited. The first 
dispute involved the National Union of Nigérian Bank Employées 
(NUNBE) under the leadership of Babs Animashaun who was its General 
Secretary. The union served as a central body for some house unions in the 
banking industry. By its structure NUNBE negotiated directly with indi-
vidual bank employers. A dispute over wage increase between the union and 
Barclays Bank (now Union Bank) was referred to the Industrial Arbitration 
Panel (IAP) in 1975. Note that the seulement procédure had commenced 
with the containment approach. The issue, it seemed, was that of delay in 
the settlement machinery. It is equally noteworthy to mention that 
Animashaun was a very outspoken unionist (sometime an extremist) whose 
activities in trade unionism were as reassuring to the rank-and-file as 
threatening to many employers with whom he negotiated. His trade union 
activities in the banking industry, especially for insisting on negotiating a 
separate agreement with government over the Udoji awards had become in-
creasingly embarrassing to government which felt that the demands were 
not only unreasonable but also undermining government wages policy. 
However, unhappy at the delay of the IAP award, Animashaun gave a 
14-day ultimatum to the Bank after which he threatened to call ail Barclays 
Bank workers on a nation-wide strike. Coincidentally on the 14th day, in 
May 1976, the IAP award which turned out to be favourable to the union, 
was made public. 
But leaders of the union claimed that poor communication network 
made contacts with ail the state branches impossible so as to inform them 
of the IAP décision and accordingly call-off the impending action. In any 
event, Barclays Bank workers in four cities (including Ibadan) outside 
Lagos went on strike immediately after the expiration of the ultimatum on 
26 May, 1976. While this one-day action may hâve caused some disruption 
in banking services in the affected cities, particularly in the commercial city 
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of Ibadan, the extent to which the strike hurt the economy may hâve been 
blown out of proportion by the press24. 
Technically, the strike appeared to be a wild-cat or unofficial action 
given that top union leaders (in Lagos) had blamed the strike on the impa-
tient leaders in the affected branches, particularly for failing to obtain 
clearance from the national headquarters in Lagos. This accusation would 
however, appear baseless, for not only is there an efficient communication 
System between Lagos and Ibadan (less than 100 miles apart), branch 
leaders at Ibadan had on their part insinuated that the reason they called-off 
the strike was due to the non-participation of the Lagos branch25. It ap-
peared, therefore, that the strike was a deliberate gimmick by top leaders of 
the union undoubtedly to "assess" or "test" the reaction of government to 
a violation of the law. 
The following day — May 27, a national daily, The Nigérian Tribune 
carried a front-page story captioned "BLOW ON DECREE Barclays 
Workers Spurn Order"26, (emphasis supplied) a rather irritating news to 
government officiais partly because the IAP awards was, after ail, favor-
able to the union. Partly, also, government conception of the matter was 
that Animashaun and his union were definitely trying to test the strength of 
government, hence the immédiate proscription of NUNBE27. The position 
of government became glaring in a statement announcing the proscription 
order. In it government pointed out that "The action of the employées of 
the Bank is... considered by the Government as a wilful act calculated by 
the union not only to disrupt the smooth running of the economy but also to 
block the way of the Government to enforce the new decree28." Whether or 
not this view is valid is debatable but it should be pointed out that the strike 
action took place only six days after the decree had been promulgated. On 
the other hand, it should be emphasised that the union did not go on strike 
24 It is fair to say that press reports , particularly in The Nigérian Tribune were decidedly 
in support of union protests against the decree. The newspaper 's reports of the period, par-
ticularly by putt ing the strike as a frontpage item on the 27 May was meant to ridicule the law, 
and or its makers . 
25 The Nigérian Tribune, 28 May 1976, p. 1. 
26 Ibid., 27 May 1976, p . 1. 
27 See Trade Disputes (Essential Services) (Proscription) Order , 1976, LN 44 Nigeria Of-
fice Gazette, Par t B . , Vol. 63 , No . 29, Lagos, 3 June 1976. Automatical ly , sections of the law 
affecting the leadership were enforced. Interestingly, a government tr ibunal subsequently 
found Animashaun guilty of mismanagement of union funds. See Report of the Tribunal of 
Inquiry into the Activities ofthe Trade Unions, Lagos, Fédéral Ministry of Information, 1977, 
pp. 82-86. 
28 The Nigérian Tribune, 28 May 1976, p. 1. 
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in Lagos, which is the base of Nigeria's economy as well as the Fédéral 
capital29. 
In the second case, two unions were simultaneously proscribed. The 
unions were the Shell-BP and Allied Workers Union of Nigeria and the 
Senior Staff Association of Shell-BP Company. The first was a junior staff 
union while the other was a management association. The dispute origi-
nated between the junior staff union and the company over housing 
allowance and Christmas bonus, although the latter issue was the immédiate 
cause of conflict. The dispute arose over an agreement concluded between 
the two parties providing for 100 per cent of pay as Christmas bonus to the 
workers but was invalidated and reduced to half by the Ministry of Labour 
consistent with the incomes policy guidelines. Apparently doubtful of the 
sincerity of management and the extent of support which it had given to the 
agreement, members of the union were dissatisfied with government déci-
sion, incomes policy notwithstanding. Accordingly they embarked on a 
strike on 20 October 1977 in défiance of the law and without notifying the 
Ministry of Labour of the existence of a trade dispute or attempted to main-
tain dialogue with their employer as required by law. Recall that if internai 
method failed a dispute had to be notified in writing after which a con-
ciliator may be appointed, and so forth. 
With respect to the Senior Staff Association, it wanted to negotiate on 
the same issue (Christmas bonus) with the company but the latter was un-
willing to negotiate, undoubtedly because of the prohibitive cost of the 
agreement it had signed with the junior staff union which already had ran 
into trouble anyway. While the association did not want to déclare a trade 
dispute, it decided to go on a sympathy strike with the junior staff union, 
understandably as an arm-twisting tactic to bring the company to the bar-
gaining table. Accordingly, members of the association not only refused to 
"make-up" or fill the gap left by the junior workers but also refused to per-
form part of their legitimate function, contrary to the expectation that such 
cadre of people would demonstrate a greater degree of maturity and respon-
sibility in such a situation. This expectation had apparently been misplaced! 
This development was embarrassing to government because the oil in-
dustry contributes more than two-thirds of government revenues. Mean-
while, the Fédéral Commissioner for Labour had publicly warned the 
workers of the illegality of their action and appealed to them to utilise the 
légal framework through a conciliator already appointed to bring about set-
tlement. The workers ignored the Commissioner's appeal and remained 
adamant insisting that government must rescind its décision on their agree-
29 Note that a clause under the Banking (Amendment) Decree, 1973 had provided for 
conditions (i.e. proscription) similar to the Trade Disputes (Essential Services) Decree, 1976 
but was never enforced, presumably because the "targeted man" never ran foui of the law! 
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ment. In a sharp reaction, the government invoked the provisions of the 
essential services law by proscribing the two unions immediately30. Justify-
ing the action, the government issued a public statement which read, in 
part: 
The fédéral Military Government is satisfied that the trade unions con-
cerned wilfully failed to comply with the procédure specified in the trade 
disputes decree, 1976 in relation to the reporting and settlement of trade 
disputes. It is also satisfied that the strike called by them is calculated not 
only to obstruct and disrupt the smooth running of the opérations of 
Shell-BP Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria but also to disrupt 
the economy of the nation31. 
A careful look at this case revealed that there was probably a greater 
économie risk caused by the strike than in the banking situation. Yet, this 
cannot be divorced from the inhérent personality clash, first within the 
management hierarchy in the company and second, between the affected 
management officiais on the one hand, and government officiais on the 
other. Observable évidence showed that the provisions of the law might not 
hâve been invoked had the senior staff association not participated in the 
strike. This view, though, has never been admitted by government officiais. 
SOME COMMENTS 
By their very nature the last two cases tended to challenge the legiti-
macy of government social and économie policies. Yet, the choice of set-
tlement procédure foliowed in undoubtedly political, for, ail things being 
equal, disputes in the médical care delivery are as threatening to the nation 
as were disputes in the banking and oil industries. Two conclusions can be 
drawn from the NUNBE case. 
On the one hand, the décision of the union to go on strike outside 
Lagos was a stratégie design by its top leaders in Lagos to demonstrate the 
union*s disaffection with the essential services decree. But why this task had 
to be carried out by NUNBE can only be explained by examining first the 
personality of the union*s leaders (especially its gênerai secretary) and se-
cond by examining how they perceive their rôle in the labour movement. On 
the other hand, the reaction of government to proscribe NUNBE can be ex-
plained not so much by the conséquences of the disruption to banking ser-
vices due to the strike but mainly by emphasizing the supremacy of govern-
ment in enforcing its laws. The proscription of NUNBE suggest, in any case 
that the authorities were after the top leadership of the union inasmuch as 
the branches of the union that went on strike were the véritable violators of 
the law. 
30 See Trade Disputes (Essential Services) (Proscription) Order , 1977, LN 55 and L N 56 
in Fédéral Republic of Nigeria, Officiai Gazette, Par t B, Vol. 64, N o . 53, Lagos, 10 November 
1977. 
31 Cited in The Nigérian Observer, 31 October 1977, p. 13. 
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In any event, the likely effects of the law on future development of in-
dustrial relations are not clear; the fact that extraneous considérations do 
enter into when to invoke the law and on which union makes any opinion 
tentative. This is more the case because Nigeria has recently returned from 
military to elected civilian government which is likely to react to trade union 
pressure in a manner quite responsive to political considérations. The 
response of the politicians will be reflected in their conception of the effi-
cient way of managing workers' discontent, freedom of association under 
the International Labour Organisation^ conventions to which Nigeria sub-
scribes, and the extent of co-operation (or coalition!) between the politi-
cians and trade unionists. 
There is, also, the uncertainty of the likely effects of the récent restruc-
ture of the trade union movement on the overall mode of labour and man-
agement relations in gênerai and the seulement of trade disputes in par-
ticular. Within the past three years the government has succeeded in restruc-
turing the 1,170 house unions in Nigeria into 42 industrial unions and the 
formation of the Nigeria Labour Congress (NLC), as the single central 
labour organisation32. Apart from the assumption that the new unions may 
likely demonstrate greater maturity in the conduct of labour relations their 
numeric strength and likely financial viability will certainly make them 
stronger and militant to the extent that a government might find it practical-
ly difficult and politically inexpedient to proscribe a whole union as it had 
done with the NUNBE. For example, given the strength and organisation 
prowess of the NUT, any attempt to proscribe any of its branches least the 
national union would constitute not only an ill-fated décision any govern-
ment can make but one which is likely to hâve adverse effects in the coun-
try. This référence to the potential power of the trade unions is made to 
underscore the most récent rôle of the NLC. Barely a year after its forma-
tion, the NLC in co-operation with its affiliâtes has intensif ied labour's de-
mand for the repeal of the essential services decree along with other restric-
tive and punitive législation of the military administration33. While a total 
abolition of the laws are not likely, modifications which conforms with ILO 
Conventions are most probable under the civilian government. 
32 Along with the 42 industrial unions are 15 management (senior staff) associat ions, 
nine employers ' associations and 4 professional associations (including the Nigérian Médical 
Associat ion) . Fo r the names and memberships of ail the unions see Industrial Relations in 
Nigeria. Development and Practice, op. cit., Appendix C. 
33 See Communique of the National Executive Council of the Nigeria Labour Congress 
held in Lagos, 22-23 May, 1979. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
While the law on essential services in Nigeria is broad enough to cover 
practically ail industries, its application is undoubtedly discretionary. In 
some cases, application of the law takes the form of containment of 
disputes where mutually satisfactory settlement are sought and achieved. In 
other cases, the eliminationist approach is followed, in which case the 
union, its members and leaders are effectively put out of business. 
However, while there are no précise yardsticks for determining which of the 
two settlement approaches shall be applied and on which union, there is 
hardly any doubt that non-economic considérations, i.e. those that hâve no 
logical relationship to the économie rationale of the law, such as political, 
do influence such décisions. In fact, expérience with the use of the pro-
scription clause thus far suggest that the personality of the trade unionist af-
fected is a major determining factor. 
Since Nigeria has recently undergone political transition (from military 
to civilian administration), it seems reasonable to assume that there will be 
some changes in both orientation and approach to the settlement of trade 
disputes in the essential services, although we do not as yet know what form 
of pattern thèse changes will take. One thing seems clear, nevertheless, that 
any government in Nigeria will closely monitor labour relations practices in 
sensitive économie and social sectors in a way consistent with its philosophy 
and degree of harmony with labour. It should be pointed out, however, that 
Nigeria's industrial relations expérience suggests that irrespective of the 
penalties imposed on the right to strike, strikes will surely occur, partly 
because government has shown its unwillingness to enforce the full provi-
sions of the law in ail cases of trade disputes. 
Given this discriminating enforcement of public policy, a broad-based 
progressive approach to the settlement of disputes, one that conform with 
the accepted Conventions of the I.L.O. on freedom of association and col-
lective bargaining, irrespective of the sector of the economy is needed. A 
progressive approach to industrial conflict does not lie in the proscription of 
unions but in speedy identification of the causes of workers' discontent and 
finding effective means of bringing about mutually satisfactory solutions. 
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Conflits de travail et services essentiels au Nigeria 
L'ordonnance de 1941 relative aux conflits de travail (arbitrage et enquête) a 
caractérisé le régime volontariste dont le Nigeria a hérité de la Grande-Bretagne. 
Bien qu'elle fût permissive, le gouvernement a traditionnellement renoncé au recours 
à la loi dans sa réglementation des conflits de travail. La loi fut finalement délaissée 
pendant la décennie 1960, en partie à cause du besoin pressant de changements insti-
tutionnels dans les relations professionnelles. Le décret relatif aux conflits de travail 
(1976) et le décret concernant les services essentiels de la même année prévoient l'un 
et l'autre des mécanismes détaillés de règlement des conflits de travail dans les ser-
vices essentiels. 
Bien que la grève, selon les nouvelles lois, entraîne comme pénalité l'interdiction 
des syndicats, trois d'entre eux seulement ont été ainsi proscrits, même si plusieurs 
d'entre eux ont fait la grève dans les services essentiels. L'article laisse entendre, 
toutefois, que le gouvernement a adopté une double approche: si certains syndicats 
ont été interdits, il fut possible pour d'autres de continuer à exister. L'application 
sélective de la loi soulève des questions fondamentales: qu'est-ce qui détermine 
quand la loi doit être appliquée et à qui doit-elle l'être? Jusqu'ici, l'expérience per-
met de se rendre compte, néanmoins, que la personnalité du chef syndical est un 
critère déterminant dans la décision de proscrire le syndicat. 
À la suite de transformations profondes dans la structure des syndicats et d'un 
changement de gouvernement, nous sommes dans l'incertitude quant au rôle de la loi 
dans le règlement des conflits de travail dans les services essentiels, quoique l'ap-
proche choisie par le nouveau gouvernement reflétera sa conception de la méthode 
idéale de surmonter le mécontentement des travailleurs et la puissance relative des 
syndicats eux-mêmes. Quoi qu'il arrive, une approche sage consiste à identifier 
rapidement les causes de conflit et à trouver des solutions mutuellement satisfai-
santes aux parties. 
